Modern Religious Cults and Movements and Quran: Deep Thought

So, then, although it may do good to few alone, 'tis proper to develope and explain this thesis:--wherefore Divinity hath deigned to share His science and intelligence with men alone. Give ear, accordingly! When God, [our] Sire and Lord, made man, after the Gods, out of an equal mixture of a less pure cosmic part and a divine,--it [naturally] came to pass the imperfections of the cosmic part remained commingled with [our] frames, and other ones [as well], by reason of the food and sustenance we have out of necessity in common with all lives; by reason of which things it needs must be that the desires, and passions, and other vices, of the mind should occupy the souls of human kind.

nor, again, shalt thou destroy it after it is born. Thou shalt not withdraw thy hand from thy son, or from thy daughter, but from their infancy thou shalt teach them the fear of the Lord.[708] Thou shalt not covet what is thy neighbour’s, nor shalt thou be avaricious. Thou shalt not be joined in soul with the haughty, but thou shalt be reckoned with the righteous and lowly. Receive thou as good things the trials[709] which come upon thee.[710] Thou shalt not be of double mind or of double tongue,[711] for a double tongue is a snare of death. Thou shalt be subject[712] to the Lord, and to [other] masters as the image of God, with modesty and fear. Thou shalt not issue orders with bitterness to thy maid-servant or thy man-servant, who trust in the same [God[713]], lest thou shouldst not[714] reverence that God who is above both; for He came to call men not according to their outward appearance,[715] but according as the Spirit had prepared them.[716] Thou shalt communicate in all things with thy neighbour; thou shalt not call[717] things thine own; for if ye are partakers in common of things which are incorruptible,[718] how much more [should you be] of those things which are corruptible![719] Thou shalt not be hasty with thy tongue, for the mouth is a snare of death. As far as possible, thou shalt be pure in thy soul. Do not be ready to stretch forth thy hands to take, whilst thou contractest them to give.

Suffer the women whom ye divorce to dwell in some part of the houses wherein ye dwell; according to the room and conveniences of the habitations which ye possess: and make them not uneasy, that ye may reduce them to straits. And if they be with child, expend on them what shall be needful, until they be delivered of their burden. And if they suckle their children for you, give them their hire;f and consult among yourselves, according to what shall be just and reasonable. And if ye be put to a difficulty herein, and another woman shall suckle the child for him, let him who hath plenty expend proportionably in the maintenance of the mother and the nurse, out of his plenty: and let him whose income is scanty expend in proportion out of that which GOD hath given him. GOD obligeth no man to more than he hath given him ability to perform: GOD will cause ease to succeed hardship. How many cities have turned aside from the command of the LORD and his apostles! Wherefore we brought them to a severe account; and we chastised them with a grievous chastisement: and they tasted the evil consequence of their business; and the end of their business was perdition.

Now if the Maker is naught else but That which makes, Alone, Simple, Uncompound, it needs must do this [making] to Itself,--to Which its Maker's making is "its being made." And as to all that's being made,--it cannot be [so made] by being made by its own self; but it must needs be made by being made by other. Without the "Maker" "made" is neither made nor is; for that the one without the other doth lose its proper nature by deprivation of that other. If, then, all things have been admitted to be two,--the "that which is being made" and "that which makes,"--[all then] are one in union of these,--the "that which leadeth" and the "that which followeth." The making God is "that which leadeth"; the "that which is being made," whatever it be, the "that which followeth."

Thus it is that virtue should prevail and outward form be forgotten. But mankind forgets not that which is to be forgotten, forgetting that which is not to be forgotten. This is forgetfulness indeed! And thus with the truly wise, wisdom is a curse, sincerity like glue, virtue only a means to acquire, and skill nothing more than a commercial capacity. For the truly wise make no plans, and therefore require no wisdom. They do not separate, and therefore require no glue. They want nothing, and therefore need no virtue. They sell nothing, and therefore are not in want of a commercial capacity. These four qualifications are bestowed upon them by God and serve as heavenly food to them. And those who thus feed upon the divine have little need for the human. They wear the forms of men, without human passions. Because they wear the forms of men, they associate with men. Because they have not human passions, positives and negatives find in them no place. Infinitesimal indeed is that which makes them man: infinitely great is that which makes them divine!

In the same manner as it is not permitted to place a vessel under a laying hen, so is it also not permitted to cover the egg laid; for the reason that a vessel must not be handled on the Sabbath except for the use of such things as are themselves permitted to be handled on the Sabbath. All the objections of Abayi being raised against R. Itz'hak's statements, he answered: " In that case there was a lack of space." (If the space occupied by a vessel is needed, that vessel may be removed, and while being removed may be used for any purpose.) Come and hear (another objection). An egg laid on the Sab bath or a festival, to prevent it from being (accidentally) cracked, may be covered with a vessel? Here the case is, also, when the space where the vessel is placed is needed. Said R. Shesheth (to his disciples): Go ye and tell R. Itz'hak that the above doctrine has already been interpreted by R. Iluna in Babylon as follows: It is permitted to make a partition on the Sabbath, to (isolate) a corpse for the sake of the living, but it is not permitted to make a partition for the sake of the corpse. How is the latter clause to be understood? R. Samuel b. Jehudah and also Shila Mari taught: In the case of a corpse lying in the sun (on the Sabbath), (to prevent the corpse from decomposing) two persons are brought to sit on the floor, each on one side (in order to bring about the making of a screen).

" Unclean heave-offerings may be handled with clean and with ordinary grain; it makes no difference where it lies: on the top or at the bottom." This is a refutation of R. Hisda? R. Hisda might say, that our Mishna treats of a heave-offering that is needed for food, while the Boraitha treats of a heave-offering when the space it occupies is needed. What impels R. Hisda to explain the Mishna in that manner? Said Rabha: " From the latter part of the Mishna it seems to be in the sense ex plained by him, for that part of the Mishna says, that if money lie on a bolster, the bolster may be turned so that the money -.hall fall down; and Rabba bar bar liana in the name of R. Johanan explained, that such is the case only if the bolster itself be needed; but if the space occupied by the bolster is required, one may lift the bolster, with the money, and deposit it elsewhere. Now, if this part of the Mishna refers to the demand for the object itself, the first part does likewise." " R.JeJmdah saitJi: ' One may take Therumah from mixed grain in proportion of one to the hundred.' ' How can this be done? In doing it, one would make a useless thing useful, and that is not permitted? R. Jehuclah holds with R. Simeon ben 3-74 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. Eluzar, who declares, that one may look upon one side of a mixed-grain pile and consider it Therumah, and cat from the other. How can it be said, however, that R. Jehudah holds with R.

The nobleman, hearing the spoken law, forthwith attained the first degree of holiness: he emptied as it were, the sea of birth and death, one drop alone remaining. By practising, apart from men, the banishment of all desire, he soon attained the one impersonal condition, not as common folk do now-a-day who speculate upon the mode of true deliverance; for he who does not banish sorrow-causing samskâras does but involve himself in every kind of question; and though he reaches to the highest form of being, yet grasps not the one and only truth. Erroneous thoughts as to the joy of heaven are still entwined by the fast cords of lust. The nobleman attending to the spoken law the cloud of darkness opened before the shining splendor. Thus he attained true sight, erroneous views forever dissipated; even as the furious winds of autumn sway to and fro and scatter all the heaped-up clouds. He argued not that Isvara was cause, nor did he advocate some cause heretical, nor yet again did he affirm there was no cause for the beginning of the world. "If the world was made by Isvara deva, there should be neither young nor old, first nor after, nor the five ways of birth; and when once born there should be no destruction. Nor should there be such thing as sorrow or calamity, nor doing wrong nor doing right; for all, both pure and impure deeds, these must come from Isvara deva. Again, if Isvara deva made the world there should be never doubt about the fact, even as a son born of his father ever confesses him and pays him reverence. Men when pressed by sore calamity ought not to rebel against him, but rather reverence him completely, as the self-existent. Nor ought they to adore more gods than one. Again, if Isvara be the maker he should not be called the self-existent, because in that he is the maker now he always should have been the maker; but if ever making, then ever self-remembering, and therefore not the self-existent one--and if he made without a purpose then is he like the sucking child; but if he made having an ever prompting purpose, then is he not, with such a purpose, self-existent? Sorrow and joy spring up in all that lives, these at least are not the works of Isvara; for if he causes grief and joy, he must himself have love and hate; but if he loves unduly, or has hatred, he cannot properly be named the self-existent. Again, if Isvara be the maker, all living things should silently submit, patient beneath the maker's power, and then what use to practise virtue? Twere equal, then, the doing right or wrong: there should be no reward of works; the works themselves being his making, then all things are the same with him, the maker, but if all things are one with him, then our deeds, and we who do them, are also self-existent. But if Isvara be uncreated, then all things, being one with him, are uncreated. But if you say there is another cause beside him as creator, then Isvara is not the 'end of all'; Isvara, who ought to be inexhaustible, is not so, and therefore all that lives may after all be uncreated--without a maker. Thus, you see, the thought of Isvara is overthrown in this discussion; and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours. Again, if it be said self-nature is the maker, this is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidyâ sâstras asserted such a thing as this, till now. That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; we cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist spring not from one nature as a cause; and yet you say self-nature is but one: it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, if it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout 'all time' have made forever that which is. But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made 'in time'; know then, for certain, self-nature cannot be the cause of all. Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all modifications, therefore all things made by it ought likewise to be free from modifications. But we see, in fact, that all things in the world are fettered throughout by modifications; therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all. If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such qualities, we answer, since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot differ in its nature from itself; but if the world be different from these qualities, then self-nature cannot be the cause. Again, if self-nature be unchangeable, so things should also be without decay; if we regard self-nature as the cause, then cause and consequence of reason should be one; but because we see decay in all things, we know that they at least are caused. Again, if self-nature be the cause, why should we seek to find 'escape'? for we ourselves possess this nature; patient then should we endure both birth and death. For let us take the case that one may find 'escape,' self-nature still will reconstruct the evil of birth. If self-nature in itself be blind, yet 'tis the maker of the world that sees. On this account, again, it cannot be the maker, because, in this case, cause and effect would differ in their character, but in all the world around us, cause and effect go hand in hand. Again, if self-nature have no aim, it cannot cause that which has such purpose. We know on seeing smoke there must be fire, and cause and result are ever classed together thus. We are forbidden, then, to say an unthinking cause can make a thing that has intelligence. The gold of which the cup is made is gold throughout from first to last, self-nature, then, that makes these things, from first to last must permeate all it makes. Once more, if 'time' is maker of the world, 'twere needless then to seek 'escape,' for 'time' is constant and unchangeable: let us in patience bear the 'intervals' of time. The world in its successions has no limits, the 'intervals' of time are boundless also. Those then who practise a religious life need not rely on 'methods' or 'expedients.' The To-lo-piu Kiu-na, the one strange Sâstra in the world, although it has so many theories, yet still, be it known, it is opposed to any single cause. But if, again, you say that 'self' is maker, then surely self should make things pleasingly; but now things are not pleasing for oneself, how then is it said that self is maker? But if he did not wish to make things so, then he who wishes for things pleasing, is opposed to self, the maker. Sorrow and joy are not self-existing, how can these be made by self? But if we allow that self was maker, there should not be, at least, an evil karman; but yet our deeds produce results both good and evil; know then that 'self' cannot be maker. But perhaps you say 'self' is the maker according to occasion, and then the occasion ought to be for good alone. But as good and evil both result from 'cause,' it cannot be that 'self' has made it so. But if you adopt the argument--there is no maker--then it is useless practising expedients; all things are fixed and certain of themselves: what good to try to make them otherwise? Deeds of every kind, done in the world, do, notwithstanding, bring forth every kind of fruit; therefore we argue all things that exist are not without some cause or other. There is both 'mind' and 'want of mind'--all things come from fixed causation; the world and all therein is not the result of 'nothing' as a cause." The nobleman, his heart receiving light, perceived throughout the most excellent system of truth. Simple, and of wisdom born; thus firmly settled in the true doctrine he lowly bent in worship at the feet of Buddha and with closed hands made his request:--

So, then, although it may do good to few alone, 'tis proper to develope and explain this thesis:--wherefore Divinity hath deigned to share His science and intelligence with men alone. Give ear, accordingly! When God, [our] Sire and Lord, made man, after the Gods, out of an equal mixture of a less pure cosmic part and a divine,--it [naturally] came to pass the imperfections of the cosmic part remained commingled with [our] frames, and other ones [as well], by reason of the food and sustenance we have out of necessity in common with all lives; by reason of which things it needs must be that the desires, and passions, and other vices, of the mind should occupy the souls of human kind.

nor, again, shalt thou destroy it after it is born. Thou shalt not withdraw thy hand from thy son, or from thy daughter, but from their infancy thou shalt teach them the fear of the Lord.[708] Thou shalt not covet what is thy neighbour’s, nor shalt thou be avaricious. Thou shalt not be joined in soul with the haughty, but thou shalt be reckoned with the righteous and lowly. Receive thou as good things the trials[709] which come upon thee.[710] Thou shalt not be of double mind or of double tongue,[711] for a double tongue is a snare of death. Thou shalt be subject[712] to the Lord, and to [other] masters as the image of God, with modesty and fear. Thou shalt not issue orders with bitterness to thy maid-servant or thy man-servant, who trust in the same [God[713]], lest thou shouldst not[714] reverence that God who is above both; for He came to call men not according to their outward appearance,[715] but according as the Spirit had prepared them.[716] Thou shalt communicate in all things with thy neighbour; thou shalt not call[717] things thine own; for if ye are partakers in common of things which are incorruptible,[718] how much more [should you be] of those things which are corruptible![719] Thou shalt not be hasty with thy tongue, for the mouth is a snare of death. As far as possible, thou shalt be pure in thy soul. Do not be ready to stretch forth thy hands to take, whilst thou contractest them to give.

Suffer the women whom ye divorce to dwell in some part of the houses wherein ye dwell; according to the room and conveniences of the habitations which ye possess: and make them not uneasy, that ye may reduce them to straits. And if they be with child, expend on them what shall be needful, until they be delivered of their burden. And if they suckle their children for you, give them their hire;f and consult among yourselves, according to what shall be just and reasonable. And if ye be put to a difficulty herein, and another woman shall suckle the child for him, let him who hath plenty expend proportionably in the maintenance of the mother and the nurse, out of his plenty: and let him whose income is scanty expend in proportion out of that which GOD hath given him. GOD obligeth no man to more than he hath given him ability to perform: GOD will cause ease to succeed hardship. How many cities have turned aside from the command of the LORD and his apostles! Wherefore we brought them to a severe account; and we chastised them with a grievous chastisement: and they tasted the evil consequence of their business; and the end of their business was perdition.

Now if the Maker is naught else but That which makes, Alone, Simple, Uncompound, it needs must do this [making] to Itself,--to Which its Maker's making is "its being made." And as to all that's being made,--it cannot be [so made] by being made by its own self; but it must needs be made by being made by other. Without the "Maker" "made" is neither made nor is; for that the one without the other doth lose its proper nature by deprivation of that other. If, then, all things have been admitted to be two,--the "that which is being made" and "that which makes,"--[all then] are one in union of these,--the "that which leadeth" and the "that which followeth." The making God is "that which leadeth"; the "that which is being made," whatever it be, the "that which followeth."

Thus it is that virtue should prevail and outward form be forgotten. But mankind forgets not that which is to be forgotten, forgetting that which is not to be forgotten. This is forgetfulness indeed! And thus with the truly wise, wisdom is a curse, sincerity like glue, virtue only a means to acquire, and skill nothing more than a commercial capacity. For the truly wise make no plans, and therefore require no wisdom. They do not separate, and therefore require no glue. They want nothing, and therefore need no virtue. They sell nothing, and therefore are not in want of a commercial capacity. These four qualifications are bestowed upon them by God and serve as heavenly food to them. And those who thus feed upon the divine have little need for the human. They wear the forms of men, without human passions. Because they wear the forms of men, they associate with men. Because they have not human passions, positives and negatives find in them no place. Infinitesimal indeed is that which makes them man: infinitely great is that which makes them divine!

In the same manner as it is not permitted to place a vessel under a laying hen, so is it also not permitted to cover the egg laid; for the reason that a vessel must not be handled on the Sabbath except for the use of such things as are themselves permitted to be handled on the Sabbath. All the objections of Abayi being raised against R. Itz'hak's statements, he answered: " In that case there was a lack of space." (If the space occupied by a vessel is needed, that vessel may be removed, and while being removed may be used for any purpose.) Come and hear (another objection). An egg laid on the Sab bath or a festival, to prevent it from being (accidentally) cracked, may be covered with a vessel? Here the case is, also, when the space where the vessel is placed is needed. Said R. Shesheth (to his disciples): Go ye and tell R. Itz'hak that the above doctrine has already been interpreted by R. Iluna in Babylon as follows: It is permitted to make a partition on the Sabbath, to (isolate) a corpse for the sake of the living, but it is not permitted to make a partition for the sake of the corpse. How is the latter clause to be understood? R. Samuel b. Jehudah and also Shila Mari taught: In the case of a corpse lying in the sun (on the Sabbath), (to prevent the corpse from decomposing) two persons are brought to sit on the floor, each on one side (in order to bring about the making of a screen).

" Unclean heave-offerings may be handled with clean and with ordinary grain; it makes no difference where it lies: on the top or at the bottom." This is a refutation of R. Hisda? R. Hisda might say, that our Mishna treats of a heave-offering that is needed for food, while the Boraitha treats of a heave-offering when the space it occupies is needed. What impels R. Hisda to explain the Mishna in that manner? Said Rabha: " From the latter part of the Mishna it seems to be in the sense ex plained by him, for that part of the Mishna says, that if money lie on a bolster, the bolster may be turned so that the money -.hall fall down; and Rabba bar bar liana in the name of R. Johanan explained, that such is the case only if the bolster itself be needed; but if the space occupied by the bolster is required, one may lift the bolster, with the money, and deposit it elsewhere. Now, if this part of the Mishna refers to the demand for the object itself, the first part does likewise." " R.JeJmdah saitJi: ' One may take Therumah from mixed grain in proportion of one to the hundred.' ' How can this be done? In doing it, one would make a useless thing useful, and that is not permitted? R. Jehuclah holds with R. Simeon ben 3-74 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. Eluzar, who declares, that one may look upon one side of a mixed-grain pile and consider it Therumah, and cat from the other. How can it be said, however, that R. Jehudah holds with R.

The nobleman, hearing the spoken law, forthwith attained the first degree of holiness: he emptied as it were, the sea of birth and death, one drop alone remaining. By practising, apart from men, the banishment of all desire, he soon attained the one impersonal condition, not as common folk do now-a-day who speculate upon the mode of true deliverance; for he who does not banish sorrow-causing samskâras does but involve himself in every kind of question; and though he reaches to the highest form of being, yet grasps not the one and only truth. Erroneous thoughts as to the joy of heaven are still entwined by the fast cords of lust. The nobleman attending to the spoken law the cloud of darkness opened before the shining splendor. Thus he attained true sight, erroneous views forever dissipated; even as the furious winds of autumn sway to and fro and scatter all the heaped-up clouds. He argued not that Isvara was cause, nor did he advocate some cause heretical, nor yet again did he affirm there was no cause for the beginning of the world. "If the world was made by Isvara deva, there should be neither young nor old, first nor after, nor the five ways of birth; and when once born there should be no destruction. Nor should there be such thing as sorrow or calamity, nor doing wrong nor doing right; for all, both pure and impure deeds, these must come from Isvara deva. Again, if Isvara deva made the world there should be never doubt about the fact, even as a son born of his father ever confesses him and pays him reverence. Men when pressed by sore calamity ought not to rebel against him, but rather reverence him completely, as the self-existent. Nor ought they to adore more gods than one. Again, if Isvara be the maker he should not be called the self-existent, because in that he is the maker now he always should have been the maker; but if ever making, then ever self-remembering, and therefore not the self-existent one--and if he made without a purpose then is he like the sucking child; but if he made having an ever prompting purpose, then is he not, with such a purpose, self-existent? Sorrow and joy spring up in all that lives, these at least are not the works of Isvara; for if he causes grief and joy, he must himself have love and hate; but if he loves unduly, or has hatred, he cannot properly be named the self-existent. Again, if Isvara be the maker, all living things should silently submit, patient beneath the maker's power, and then what use to practise virtue? Twere equal, then, the doing right or wrong: there should be no reward of works; the works themselves being his making, then all things are the same with him, the maker, but if all things are one with him, then our deeds, and we who do them, are also self-existent. But if Isvara be uncreated, then all things, being one with him, are uncreated. But if you say there is another cause beside him as creator, then Isvara is not the 'end of all'; Isvara, who ought to be inexhaustible, is not so, and therefore all that lives may after all be uncreated--without a maker. Thus, you see, the thought of Isvara is overthrown in this discussion; and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours. Again, if it be said self-nature is the maker, this is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidyâ sâstras asserted such a thing as this, till now. That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; we cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist spring not from one nature as a cause; and yet you say self-nature is but one: it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, if it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout 'all time' have made forever that which is. But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made 'in time'; know then, for certain, self-nature cannot be the cause of all. Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all modifications, therefore all things made by it ought likewise to be free from modifications. But we see, in fact, that all things in the world are fettered throughout by modifications; therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all. If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such qualities, we answer, since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot differ in its nature from itself; but if the world be different from these qualities, then self-nature cannot be the cause. Again, if self-nature be unchangeable, so things should also be without decay; if we regard self-nature as the cause, then cause and consequence of reason should be one; but because we see decay in all things, we know that they at least are caused. Again, if self-nature be the cause, why should we seek to find 'escape'? for we ourselves possess this nature; patient then should we endure both birth and death. For let us take the case that one may find 'escape,' self-nature still will reconstruct the evil of birth. If self-nature in itself be blind, yet 'tis the maker of the world that sees. On this account, again, it cannot be the maker, because, in this case, cause and effect would differ in their character, but in all the world around us, cause and effect go hand in hand. Again, if self-nature have no aim, it cannot cause that which has such purpose. We know on seeing smoke there must be fire, and cause and result are ever classed together thus. We are forbidden, then, to say an unthinking cause can make a thing that has intelligence. The gold of which the cup is made is gold throughout from first to last, self-nature, then, that makes these things, from first to last must permeate all it makes. Once more, if 'time' is maker of the world, 'twere needless then to seek 'escape,' for 'time' is constant and unchangeable: let us in patience bear the 'intervals' of time. The world in its successions has no limits, the 'intervals' of time are boundless also. Those then who practise a religious life need not rely on 'methods' or 'expedients.' The To-lo-piu Kiu-na, the one strange Sâstra in the world, although it has so many theories, yet still, be it known, it is opposed to any single cause. But if, again, you say that 'self' is maker, then surely self should make things pleasingly; but now things are not pleasing for oneself, how then is it said that self is maker? But if he did not wish to make things so, then he who wishes for things pleasing, is opposed to self, the maker. Sorrow and joy are not self-existing, how can these be made by self? But if we allow that self was maker, there should not be, at least, an evil karman; but yet our deeds produce results both good and evil; know then that 'self' cannot be maker. But perhaps you say 'self' is the maker according to occasion, and then the occasion ought to be for good alone. But as good and evil both result from 'cause,' it cannot be that 'self' has made it so. But if you adopt the argument--there is no maker--then it is useless practising expedients; all things are fixed and certain of themselves: what good to try to make them otherwise? Deeds of every kind, done in the world, do, notwithstanding, bring forth every kind of fruit; therefore we argue all things that exist are not without some cause or other. There is both 'mind' and 'want of mind'--all things come from fixed causation; the world and all therein is not the result of 'nothing' as a cause." The nobleman, his heart receiving light, perceived throughout the most excellent system of truth. Simple, and of wisdom born; thus firmly settled in the true doctrine he lowly bent in worship at the feet of Buddha and with closed hands made his request:--